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 ASRS Reporting
• General and Dispatcher Intake
• Dispatch Personnel Related Events - General 
Overview
 Fuel Issues Related to Policy
 Filed Alternate Issues
Topics of Discussion
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Report Processing Flow
Airline Safety Action Program (ASAP) and Air 
Traffic Safety Action Program (ATSAP) reports
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Monthly Intake
1981 – 2013
ASRS Report Volume Profile
 37 years of confidential 
safety reporting
 Over 1,150,000 reports 
received
 Over 5,800 alert 
messages issued
 Over 6,700 reports per 
month, or 323 per 
working day
 Total report intake for 
2013 was 80,840
 Current rate estimate for 
2014 is approximately 
90,000 reports
Aviation Safety Reporting System
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ASAP Reporting to ASRS
 Overall ASAP Intake
• 181 Total Programs
• 76 Air Carriers
 Reporting Groups
• 74 Pilot
• 44 Mechanic
• 39 Dispatch
• 19 Flight Attendant
• 5 Ground Crew
 Secure Electronic Data connection protocols between airline 
and ASRS
• 179 Programs
• 75 Airlines
ASRS Electronic Transmission 
Methodology compatible with 
numerous software platforms
More airline programs being
added continuously
26% of all reports are matched to unique events in 2013
March 2014Aviation Safety Reporting System
ASRS Products
 These products and services fulfill the program’s 
mission to disseminate safety data
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Incident Reporter Distribution
January – December 2013
n = 80,840
Source:  100% ASRS Report Data
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Dispatcher Report Intake
2008 – 2013
n = 5,560
Source:  100% ASRS Report Data
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Dispatch Report Intake – Top Ten Anomalies
January – December 2013
n = 1,870
Source:  100% ASRS Report Data
Categories are not mutually exclusive.  Therefore, a single incident may be coded by ASRS analysts as involving more than one anomaly.
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ASRS Report Intake From Dispatchers, Air Carrier FLC, Air Taxi FLC, ATC, 
Flight Attendants and Maintenance Intake – Fuel Issues
2009 – 2013
Fuel Issues, n = 2,092
Total intake does not include General Aviation FLC, Ground Personnel, or “Other” reports.
Fuel Issues reported by Dispatchers, 
Air Carrier FLC, Air Taxi FLC, ATC, 
Flight Attendants and Maintenance
Source:  100% ASRS Report Data
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Fuel Issues - Reporter Function
January – December 2013
n = 658
Source:  100% ASRS Report Data
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Fuel Issues – Concurrent Anomalies
January – December 2013
n = 658
Categories are not mutually exclusive.  Therefore, a single incident may be coded by ASRS analysts as involving more than one anomaly.
Fuel Issues 
In Primary 
Analysis
Source:  100% ASRS Report Data
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Fuel Issues Related to Policy
 Examples of Fuel Policy Issues
• Flight fuel planning software issues 
• Questionable mandated reserve fuel calculations
• Mandated maximum holding fuel  
• Dispatch with minimum legal fuel quantity
• Unrealistic enroute altitudes and terminal routings
• Fuel Bias (actual burn exceeds forecasts) 
• Interpretation of MEL fuel requirements
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 ERJ 145 Captain addressed flaws in the manner by 
which his airline computes required fuel.
Captain Reported: “... I knew it was tight on gas and the Dispatcher did 't give us
any add or fuel to play with, so I flew powered back and as fuel conscious as I 
could.... Upon closer inspection my release thought I needed only 1301 for reserve. 
There is no way the EMB can fly for 45 minutes at low altitudes and burn only 
1301 pounds of fuel.... My planned arrival fuel was supposed to have been 2064 
and it was just under 1800 even with me climbing steeper, flying slower and using 
as little as possible with a tailwind. I should also mention we got straight out of 
ORD with no delays and minimal ground fuel burn so we took off with a few 
hundred extra than minimum takeoff fuel. All in all, release fuel from ORD to ZZZ 
should be several hundred pounds more for safe operation. Dispatch should revise 
this release to include crossing Shelbyville at 14,000 feet plus a realistic amount 
for required reserve fuel. In addition they should always give an additional 500 
pounds at minimum to cover contingencies due to variations in flight.”
(ACN 1078188 Excerpt)
t i  t : “... I  it  ti t    t  i t r i n't i  
  r f l t  l  it ,  I fl  r     f l i   I 
l ....  l r i ti   r l  t t I  l   f r r r . 
r  i    t    fl  f r  i t  t l  ltit   r  l  
  f f l....  l  rri l f l   t     
 it  j t r   it   li i  t r, fl i l r  i  
 littl   i l  it   t il i . I l  l  ti   t tr i t t f 
 it   l   i i l r  f l r    t  ff it   f  
r  tr  t  i i  t ff f l. ll i  ll, r l  f l fr   t   
l   r l r   r  f r f  r ti . i t  l  r i  
t i  r l  t  i l  r i  l ill  t ,  f t l  r li ti  t 
f r r ir  r r  f l. I  iti  t  l  l  i   iti l  
 t i i  t  r ti i   t  ri ti  i  fli t.”
(   r t)
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 Captain reports being shorted on fuel for the planned 
flight which resulted in using fuel that was being 
tankered. New dispatchers and new dispatch 
planning software were cited as factors.
Captain stated: “Operating a through flight with an aircraft and 
terminal change in the hub. Dispatch release received with 
tankering fuel. I did not thoroughly review the release…so I missed 
that the flight plan was short both time and fuel. If you look at the 
last segment, it shows from the VOR to the irp rt, a distance of 21 
NM, would take 1 (ONE!!!) minute. It actually took 16 minutes. Our 
burn was 1,000 pounds over release [burnout] fuel. Dispatch is 
trying to tighten up on fuel and at the same time the dispatchers 
are not adjusting the poor flight plans. The result is the pilots 
having their necks hanging out....”
(ACN 1082018 Excerpt)
i  ti   t  fli t it   i ft  
t i l  i  t  . i  l  i  i  
i l. I i  t t l  i  t  l  I i  
  li  l     i   l. If  l  t t  
l t t, it  f  t   t  t  ai o t,  i t  f  
, l  t   !!!  i t . It t ll  t   i t .  
  ,    l   l. i  i  
i   i    l     i   i  
  j i    li  l .  lt i  t  il t  
i  t i   i  t....
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 A B737-700 crew and Dispatcher were confused 
about the proper preflight weight and balance fuel 
documentation procedure in accordance with the 
MEL when a single Center Tank fuel pump is 
inoperative.
First Officer Reported: “We were p eflighting the flight 
and there was an MEL for one of t e center fuel tank 
pumps being out of service. After reading the MEL, 
there was a bit of confusion in regards to 
documentation on the load sheet. While there was no 
safety of flight issue, we were unsure if the center tank 
fuel had to be incorporated into the zero fuel weight; 
3,000 pounds of it for the actual flight. It was 
documented on the fuel sheet but not reflected in the 
zero fuel weight.”
(ACN 1111266 Excerpt)
li i li
h l
i i i
i i i
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li i i
l i i l i
i l li
l l i
l i
(   r t)
Dispatcher Reported: “I arrived today and took over flight. I 
decided to do fuel uplift roughly 30 minutes prior to departure and 
saw MEL 28-2-04 (Left Center Tank Fuel Boost Pump) on this 
aircraft. I adjusted my fuel and adjusted the adjusted takeoff gross 
weight (ATOG) to comply with the MEL, but I did not lock the flight 
or call th  Operations Ag nt. The plan was don  correctly nd the 
aircraft weights were within limits, but the Opera ions Agent did not 
check the boxes on their weight and balance page in OTIS to 
appropriately apply the MEL. The Captain and First Officer were 
reviewing the loading schedule prior to departure and did not 
question the fact that there was no ballast fuel notated on the 
loading schedule in the zero fuel weight adjustments section. 
(ACN 1111266 Excerpt)
i   I i  t   t   fli t. I 
i  t   f l lift l   i t  i  t  t   
   ft t   l t   t i  
i ft. I j t   f l  j t  t  j t  t ff  
i t  t  l  it  t  , t I i  t l  t  fli t 
 ll t  ti  e t.  l   tl   t  
i ft i t   it i  li it , t t  ti  t i  t 
 t    t i  i t  l   i  I  t  
i t l  l  t  .  t i   i t ffi   
i i  t  l i  l  i  t  t   i  t 
ti  t  f t t t t    ll t f l t t   t  
l i  l  i  t   f l i t j t t  ti . 
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 Dispatcher added an additional 1,000 pounds of fuel 
over the computer flight plan model contrary to 
company policy. At the planned destination the 
aircraft executed a go-around for weather and landed 
at its alternate below reserve fuel..
Fuel Issues Related to Policy
Dispatcher Reported: “… Flight diverted after a missed-approach due to 
thunderstorm activity at the originally planned airport.  My concern is that the 
flight burned into its reserve fuel getting to its first, and closest, alternate.... I   
first released this flight with company hold fuel and then went back and added 
two alternates because I di  not like what I was seeing on th  adar.... The 
forecast weather was still calling for "alternate none" conditions. I also added 
1,000 LBS of Dispatcher add fuel on the first release. Where, and with how 
much fuel, would this flight have landed with if I had not added the 1,000 LBS 
of dispatch added fuel, and gone against fuel policy, and added two 
alternates? If the crew would have attempted the same approach, without the 
1,000 LBS of Dispatcher added fuel, and then diverted ... his arrival fuel would 
have been under 2,500 LBS! To me this shows that the company policy of 12 
minutes of hold fuel, when thunderstorm activity is present or forecasted, is 
not a safe amount of fuel...”
(ACN 899862 Excerpt)
i t  t : li t i t  ft   i -   t  
t t  ti it  t t  i i ll  l  i t.    i  t t t  
fli t  i t  it   f l tti  t  it  fi t,  l t, lt t .... I   
fi t l  t i  fli t it   l  f l  t  t    
t  lt t   I i  t li  t I  i   t  r ....  
f t t   till lli  f  lt t   iti . I l   
,   f i t   f l  t  fi t l . ,  it   
 f l, l  t i  fli t  l  it  if I  t t  ,   
f i t   f l,   i t f l li ,   t  
lt t If t   l   tt t  t   , it t t  
,   f i t   f l,  t  i t  ... i  rri l f l l  
   ,  !   t i   t t t   li  f  
i t  f l  f l,  t t  ti it  i  t  f t , i  
t  f  t f f l...
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 Filed Alternate Issues
• Non-required alternate flights
• Minimum Fuel and alternate requirements
• Weather Changes – Reference different weather 
sources for a alternate planning
• Incorrect alternate planning due to conflicting 
information sources
• Late TAF changes resulting in illegal alternates
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 Brief airport closure ends in disagreement between 
Dispatcher and Flight Crew regarding minimum fuel 
and alternate routing.
“…flight was planned FOD 5.2 no alternate.  Weather was clear and 
good. When flight was on final at 5,000 FT he sent ACARS needing
altern te because airport was closed. I sked why a d got no response. 
Called ops and they called someone and reported there was a brief field 
closure for unknown reason but they were open.  …I had run burn for 
[other airport] so I sent burn  2.7. No response. I called Tower and was 
told that when my pilot had demanded an estimate on closure the best 
they had was approximately 2 hours and he diverted. Told me flight was 
talking to center and that they was open and good.  …later pilot called. He 
was upset with my plan of 5.2 arrival fuel.  He had landed with 3.0. 
Tried to explain it was the proper plan given the conditions. He felt he 
should always be given back pocket fuel....”
(ACN 1117636 Excerpt)
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Filed Alternates
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 Dispatcher reported a flight was dispatched without a 
required alternate.“Flight d parted …7 minutes ahead of schedule. A new 
TAF came out at [13 minutes before takeoff] which 
required that an alternate be added. Neither the pilot or 
I caught in time. I added ZZZ Airport as an alternate 
and sent the crew the burns.”
(ACN 1119357 Excerpt)
li e i l
i i
i l i il
i i i l
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 TAF change made an alternate airport illegal.
Filed Alternates
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 Dispatcher reported a conflict between sources of 
information for alternate routing in reference to 
NOTAMs.
“I went to list ZZZ as an alternate for ZZZ1 and oticed an issue
between the NOTAMs showing for ZZZ in SABRE, Software B and 
Software C. The NOTAMs shown in Software C and Software B  
looked exactly the same while the NOTAMs in Sabre were different
…. These sources not matching could lead to many problems such 
as figuring incorrect alternate minimums if a glideslope or LOC 
were out of service. What is the fix for this? How many other 
releases have I sent where I haven’t seen ALL of the NOTAMs? 
Are the pilots missing NOTAMs in the weather package I create for 
them. If so I may be setting them up for failure as well.”
(ACN 1123756 Excerpt)
I t t  li t    lt t  f    n ti   i
t  t   i  f   i  , ft    
ft  .    i  ft    ft    
l  tl  t   il  t   i    iff t
.   t t i  l  l  t   l   
 fi i  i t lt t  i i  if  li l    
 t f i . t i  t  fi  f  t i    t  
l   I t  I ’t   f t   
 t  il t  i i   i  t  t   I t  f  
t . If  I   tti  t   f  f il   ll.
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QUESTIONS?
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CONTACT INFO
Linda Connell, NASA ASRS Program Director
Linda.J.Connell@nasa.gov
(408) 541-2827
Dennis Doyle, ASRS Project Manager (BAH)
Dennis.J.Doyle@nasa.gov
(408) 541-2831
